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Mary T. Noonan, Esq. VIA HAND-DELIVERY 
Clerk of the Court 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Kent L. Brown and Larry R. Hendricks, Plaintiffs/Appel-
lants v, Roy B. Moore: Elaine B. Weis; and The Department 
of Financial Institutions of Utah, Defendants/Appellees, 
Case No. 920703-CA 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
Appellants Kent L. Brown ("Brown") and Larry R. Hendricks 
("Hendricks"), by and through their undersigned counsel, hereby 
object and respond to the letter dated February 26, 1993 by 
counsel for Appellees sent to the Court after oral argument (held 
February 17, 1993), purportedly to advise of new supplemental 
authority entitled Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 1991). 
OBJECTION TO CONSIDERATION OF APPELLEES* SUBMISSION 
Brown and Hendricks object to consideration of the described 
submission of Appellees on the following grounds: 
1. The Prows case cited in the letter is not a decision 
which has only recently come to the attention of Appellees. 
Appellees argued in the district court in this action that the 
unpublished decision of the Third District Court in the Prows 
case was authority to support the position of Appellees. R. at 
267, 274.1 
1
 This was an improper argument at the time since it violated 
Rule 4-508 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration prohibiting 
references to unpublished opinions with no precedential value, as 
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2. Counsel for Appellees in this case were also counsel for 
the State of Utah and the Department of Financial Institutions as 
parties in the Prows case. Since the Prows opinion of the Utah 
Supreme Court was released in early December of 1991, before the 
briefing began in this appeal presently before the Court, the Prows 
decision is not a matter which can properly be viewed as having 
only recently come to the attention of Appellees or their counsel. 
3. The Prows opinion was cited in Appellants1 Reply Brief 
(at p. 12) for the limited purpose of providing background facts 
regarding certain aspects of the history of the situation presented 
here, only to rebut an unsupported assertion in Appellees' brief. 
Appellees had full opportunity to refer to the Prows opinion at 
oral argument, but chose not to do so. That decision does not 
now entitle Appellees to argue the case in a subsequent written 
submission to the Court. 
4. Appellees' complete and presumably intentional failure to 
even mention the Prows opinion in their principal brief, shows that 
Appellees' counsel recognized then that the Prows opinion has no 
application to this case. Not only are the relevant facts in Prows 
different and distinguishable from those in the present case, the 
legal theories upon which the two cases have proceeded are entirely 
different. 
5. To allow Appellees now to have the information in their 
letter of February 26, 1993 considered by this Court subverts the 
orderly process so carefully prescribed in the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure and should not be countenanced. 
SUBSTANTIVE REPLY 
Should this Court decide to allow consideration of Appellees' 
letter of February 26, 1993, notwithstanding the procedural 
problems therewith described above, Appellants Brown and Hendricks 
respond substantively as follows: 
I. Prows is Distinguishable on Both its Facts and Legal Theories. 
As Appellees themselves partially acknowledge and concede in 
paragraph 2 of their February 26, 1993 letter, the Prows case is 
was then the case. 
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readily distinguished from the case at bar. In Prows, there 
apparently was no written contract between the State Department of 
Financial Institutions and Mr. Prows and Mr. Wood, the new owners 
of Foothill Thrift. 
In the present case, Appellants Brown and Hendricks entered 
into formal written contracts with both the Department of Financial 
Institutions ("DFI") and the Industrial Loan Guaranty Corporation 
("ILGC"). Both contracts were specifically reviewed and approved 
by Defendant Weis as Commissioner of the DFI. Both contracts were 
premised on a written pro forma projection of the anticipated 
future performance of Western Heritage Thrift & Loan ("Western 
Heritage") under its new owners. In the Prows opinion, there is 
no reference to nor reliance on any such arrangement, which was 
missing in that case. 
In Prows, the Supreme Court held that the only contract there 
alleged, one between Foothill and the ILGC, was not based on any 
"bargain" made in that case, since the consideration from each 
party was provided only pursuant to statute. Prows, 822 P.2d 
at 767-768. Further, the contract claim was not made by the 
individual plaintiffs, but rather by plaintiff Foothill Federated, 
which asserted that the ILGC was obligated only to guarantee 
"statutorily mandated levels" of insurance coverage for deposits. 
Id. By contrast, the contract claim of Brown and Hendricks does 
not seek enforcement of statutory obligations, and is based on a 
written agreement between them individually, on the one hand, and 
the DFI, on the other. 
In Prows, no constitutional or taking claim was alleged and 
the Court was not asked to examine the circumstances of any 
seizure which may have there occurred. Moreover, any such seizure 
occurred, if at all, under circumstances quite different from 
those of the present action. 
II. The Brown and Hendricks Contract was Based on Substantial 
Consideration, Not Statutory in Nature. 
Appellees, in suggesting in point (2) of their letter that the 
Brown and Hendricks contract may suffer a statutory consideration 
infirmity similar to the entirely different "contract" alleged in 
Prows, improperly construe and attempt to misapply the Prows 
holding. In the case at bar, Brown and Hendricks specifically 
bargained with the DFI to invest $550,000.00 of new capital and 
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personal management services in return for a reasonable opportunity 
to make Western Heritage sufficiently profitable so that they might 
make back their investment and more. This consideration was not 
statutory on either side. Brown and Hendricks were not obligated 
by statute to contribute anything to Western Heritage. Their 
decision to do so was induced by the implied promise of the DFI, 
inherent in the pro forma and written contract based thereon, to 
allow them to manage Western Heritage for a reasonable period of 
time. 
While Utah statutes gave Commissioner Weis the power to 
require the stock of Western Heritage to be transferred away 
from its prior owners, which was done in 1984, that statutory power 
was exercisable only because Western Heritage's prior owners had 
allowed it to become a failing financial institution. This did 
not depend on any conduct or consideration which originated with 
Brown and Hendricks. The statute did not obligate Commissioner 
Weis to transfer that stock to any new investor. She could and 
presumably would have kept that stock for the DFI in December 
1984 were it not for the new investment of capital, management 
experience and effort which Brown and Hendricks brought to the 
deal. This was reflected in Commissioner Weis' requiring the 
three-year future financial projections as a basis for the DFI's 
willingness to transfer the stock to Brown and Hendricks. 
Ill. The State's Taking Order Deprived Brown and Hendricks of any 
Legal Basis for Compensation in Liquidation Proceedings. 
The theoretical suggestion contained in point (3) of 
Appellees' letter of February 26, 1993 is a new argument, raised 
on appeal for the first time. It also ignores the fact that the 
ex parte taking order depriving Brown and Hendricks of all of their 
title to Western Heritage and its assets, leaves no legal basis for 
Brown and Hendricks to claim, as former owners, any right to any 
residual value which the liquidation proceedings might produce. 
Moreover, that taking and divestiture precluded Brown and 
Hendricks from any meaningful participation in the management of 
the liquidation proceedings. This exclusion makes it less likely 
for any excess recovery to be achieved by liquidators who are 
less familiar with the thrift's assets. In addition, the State 
consolidated the liquidation proceedings of many thrifts in such 
a way that any excess produced by Western Heritage goes to pay 
depositors of other thrifts, further lessening the likelihood 
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that there could ever be any excess available for Brown and 
Hendricks, even if they still had the right to seek such payment, 
because the other thrifts being liquidated with Western Heritage 
by the Appellees were much worse off financially than Western 
Heritage. This transfer of "surplus" collections only could be 
accomplished because of the taking of title to Western Heritage and 
its assets from Brown and Hendricks. 
Finally, the premise that underlies the unavailable remedy 
suggested by Appellees is that good and profitable management 
will be appropriately rewarded through a greater surplus while 
inadequate management will be penalized by its inability to 
generate a surplus. That premise supports the claims of Brown 
and Hendricks. 
Brown and Hendricks were recruited to step in and save a 
dying institution just moments before it would have otherwise 
taken its last breath, they provided new life blood for the thrift 
in the form of new capital contributions, were providing the best 
care and management possible for their patient, the thrift, and 
were significantly ahead of schedule in strengthening it and making 
it healthy when Appellees took Western Heritage. Appellees have 
misdiagnosed the problem created by Appellees and their proposed 
treatment is no cure. 
An original plus seven copies hereof are respectfully 
submitted this 4th day of March, 1993, and today I have sent a copy 
to Mr. Denton M. Hatch, and Mr. Bryce H. Pettey, counsel for 
Appellees, by first class mail. 
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